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Great GameAbstract This article deals with the encounters between a traditional Korean rural and island pop-
ulation and western military forces when the British navy occupied Geomundo, an archipelago
known to them as Port Hamilton, for 22 months between 1885 and 1887. The paper first outlines
the sometimes painful process of East Asian countries being opened up to trade and outside influ-
ences in the 19th century, a process sometimes urged upon them by naval weapons in this era of
gunboat diplomacy. This provides the setting for the Port Hamilton Affair itself when in prepara-
tion for possible war with Russia, a British naval squadron steamed into Port Hamilton and took it
without reference to the local people or their national government. After brief reference to the polit-
ical consequences of this action, the focus is then on what the records from the occupation and ear-
lier investigations by the British, who had long coveted the islands’ strategic harbour, reveal about
the life of the islanders. The article considers both their traditional life, from a time rather before
western travel accounts were written about the Korean mainland, and how the islanders fared under
the British.
 2016 Institution for Marine and Island Cultures, Mokpo National University. Publishing services by
Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).The reluctant opening up of East Asia
Korea, the Land of the Morning Calm, bore also another
sobriquet in the 19th century as the ‘Hermit Kingdom’; ‘her-
mit’ was used, for example, by William Elliot Griffis in the title
of his book, Corea: the Hermit Nation (1882). A hermit isisolated and inwardly focused and a British naval officer,
Cyprian Bridge (1876: 101) was imputing such characteristics
to Korea some years before Griffis’s book appeared when he
wrote: ‘Korea is the last semi-civilised state which has resisted
the attempts of foreigners to open intercourse with it’. Bridge’s
spatial context was the nations of East Asia, which one by one,
and with much reluctance, over the previous decades had been
forced to come to agreements with aggressive western nations
to open themselves up to trade and other influences. China,
defeated in the First Opium War of 1839–1842, had been
forced to sign the 1842 Treaty of Nanking with Great Britain,
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was forced into its own unequal treaties from 1854 when the
Convention of Kanagawa (strengthened into the Treaty of
Kanagawa in 1858) was forced upon the reluctant Asian
nation by the USA under the threats of the ‘black ships’ of
Commodore Matthew Perry in a classic example of gunboat
diplomacy. As was the case with China, Japan’s first treaty
was soon followed by others with western nations and a num-
ber of treaty ports were opened up for trade and foreign
residence.
Prior to the appearance of Commodore Perry off its coasts
Japan had been just as hermit-like as Korea. Its policy of
national seclusion, sakoku, imposed from the 1630s had kept
the country almost completely isolated. A British diplomat
of the period compared Japan to Sleeping Beauty, whose
dreams were then interrupted by the ‘eager and vigorous West’
(Satow, 1921: 90). Before the interruption, Japan had had just
four points of contact and trade with the outside world: with
Hokkaido to the north, which was then peopled by the Ainu
and was not brought fully into the Japanese realm until being
colonised from 1869; with the Ryukyu kingdom (Okinawa) to
the southwest, which was annexed by Japan in 1879; with
Korea through a trading post at Busan managed through the
strategic and sometimes contested island of Tsushima, and
finally with Europe in the form of the Dutch East India Com-
pany, Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC). The VOC
was allowed access to Dejima (Japanese for ‘exit island’), an
artificial island off Nagasaki, where both their trade and their
employees could be carefully monitored and controlled.
(Dejima is now in the process of being reconstructed as a her-
itage project and tourist attraction).
Being opened up by the treaties undoubtedly stimulated East
Asian development and industrialisation. For example in Japan,
the Scottish entrepreneur, Thomas Blake Glover who moved to
Nagasaki in 1859, was involved with railway development and
coal mining. He helped to found what are now the Mitsubishi
manufacturing empire and the Kirin brewery. However, the
transition towards a modern state in Japan was certainly not
smooth or peaceful. There was reluctance amongst some tradi-
tionalists to accept the new arrangements and the new, foreign,
people. One example was the Namagugi Incident on September
1862when aBritishmerchantwas killed inwhat could be read as
a dispute over precedence on the public road near Kanagawa
when his party of westerners clashed with the train and retinue
of Daimyo ShimadzuHisamitsu, father and regent of the Prince
of Satsuma (the name for southern Kyushu, around
Kagoshima). The Namagugi Incident led directly to the brief
Anglo-SatsumaWar of 1863, whenBritish warships bombarded
Kagoshima. That action and other clashes with the west led
some in Japan to realise that it had to modernise and the Meiji
restoration of 1868 (and the violent response to it) was one
result. After a somewhat bloody and contested journey Japan
became a simulacrum of a western nation with a readiness to
adopt colonialist attitudes – also gunboat diplomacy – in its
interactions with other East Asian nations: the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894–1895; the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905,
and its colonisation programme. Before such major events,
Japan had imposed upon Korea the latter’s first foreign – and
unequal – treaty, the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876. This was clas-
sic gunboat diplomacy (Kim, 2012), ‘diplomacy with a gun to
the temple’ (Cumings, 1997: 102). Actual warships were
involved, Japan sending ships and troops to Busan and Gangh-wado in January 1876 with demands for a treaty in retaliation
for what may well have been a rather too convenient incident
in September 1875 when its warship, theUnyoMaru, ostensibly
on a surveying mission, had attracted Korean fire from Gangh-
wado. As with Japan and China, Korea’s first foreign treaty was
soon followed by a number of others and western trade, people
and influence challenged traditional Korea.
Many elements within the ‘Hermit Nation’ were antipathetic
towards foreign influences, including significant people such as
the conservative Yi Ha-eung, always referred to (under various
spellings) as the Daewongun, Prince of the Great Court and
regent to his young son, King Gojong (Yi Myong-bok). Korea
had for centuries given tribute to China in a Confucian-style
familial relationship, China serving as its vassal’s ‘big brother’.
However, China had largely left Korea to its own devices and
had not imposed strong controls. It is significant that the Treaty
of Ganghwa, which recognised Korea as a sovereign state, was
signed after themore progressiveGojong had assumed rule him-
self in 1873. After the treaties there was unrest: the Imo Incident
of 1882 and the Gapsin Coup of 1884. These included Japanese
involvement, countered by China which began to assert a much
more directive approach to its ‘little brother’. These two nations
were to fight over – in both senses of that word –Korea in 1894–
1895 in the Sino-Japanese War and a decade later, after its deci-
sive victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, Japan
took control of Korea, first as a protectorate and then from
1910–1945 as colonial ruler. In Qing China the Boxer Rebellion
at the turn of the 19th century was only one example of anti-
foreign unrest.The Port Hamilton Affair
It is against this situation of East Asian enforced interaction
with outside powers, which often stimulated strong, sometimes
violent reactions within and between the nations, that the Port
Hamilton Affair took place. This brought onto the stage two
other nations with Asian pretentions: Great Britain and Rus-
sia. Russia at this period was actively involved in engagement
with Asia, following its defeat in its European theatre in the
Crimean War. Territory had been obtained from China under
the Treaty of Peking (Beijing) in 1860, after which its Pacific
port of Vladivostok – a name that means, somewhat challeng-
ingly, ‘Ruler of the East’ – was founded. Vladivostok became
the base for a Russian fleet in 1872. In 1884 and into 1885 Rus-
sia had become active in its undefined border region with
Afghanistan. Russia occupied the Merv oasis and, more signif-
icantly, in March 1885 clashed with Afghan troops further
south at Panjdeh. This was seen to endanger Herat, a strategic
town of western Afghanistan, the possession of which by Rus-
sia would threaten British India. Britain could not accept such
a possibility and for a few months it seemed likely that Britain
and Russia would go to war. That had an impact much further
east, for Britain, properly called then the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, took pre-emptive action against
Russia by seizing the Korean archipelago now called Geo-
mundo. This group of islands encloses an extensive water body
known to the British, who had surveyed the area in 1845, as
Port Hamilton. The British had thought of seizing this strate-
gic asset in both 1860 and, more seriously in 1875. Finally, in
April 1885 it was taken. Two principal reasons can be
advanced for the action at this time. Firstly British possession
24 S.A. Roylewould deny the islands and associated harbor to Russia which
was thought to be in search of an alternative or at least an
additional naval base in the region, one which did not suffer
Vladivostok’s seasonal problems of ice and fog. Secondly, pos-
session would facilitate any action to be taken by the British
against the Russian fleet and naval base at Vladivostok should
war break out.
That the British felt able just to seize what they accepted
was Korean territory must be seen in the context of those dec-
ades of western involvement with – and often aggression
towards – East Asia. The seizure was another example of gun-
boat diplomacy, although in this case, it was more gunboats
than diplomacy at least at first. For the British did not negoti-
ate for possession of the islands, did not ask the leave of the
Korean authorities, still less of the c. 2000 native islanders res-
ident there, who lived in four villages, two each on the islands
now called Seodo (formerly Sodo) and Dongdo (Sunhodo). On
15 April 1885 the powerless and helpless islanders would just
have observed what must have been the startling appearance
of HMS Agamemnon, an ironclad turret battleship of 8510
tons, accompanied by HMS Pegasus, a six-gun sloop of 1130
tons and HMS Firebrand, a small gunboat. The ships anchored
in Port Hamilton and within a short time the British began to
construct shore facilities for a resident garrison. This was on
the third island of the group, then called by the British, Obser-
vatory Island, which now, as Godo, houses the chief central
place of Geomundo, the village of Geomun.
‘Diplomacy’ followed the gunboats, since seizure of these
Korean islands in such a peremptory fashion was regarded
as shocking even when set against the backdrop of western
activities in East Asia; even if set against the contemporary
endeavour of colonialism. The British diplomats in East Asia,
their masters in London, and their contacts and counterparts
of other western nations as well as Korea, Japan, China and
Russia became much involved in dealing with the political
and geopolitical consequences of the Port Hamilton Affair.
In a nutshell, Korea continually protested, to be fobbed off
by British obfuscation and prevarication with the constant
refrain that the occupation was only a temporary expedient.
China and Japan could not publically condone the seizing of
territory, not least through fears that the action would serve
as a precedent for others, for which read Russia, to do like-
wise. Privately they were more sanguine about the action, for
they did not wish to see Russian expansion in the region. In
the end, after the threat to British India from Russia in Afgha-
nistan had receded through the agreement on a demarcated
boundary line, China was able to negotiate an agreement with
Russia that the latter would not seize the islands if the British
left. They did leave, having decided that the benefits of main-
taining the islands would not repay the cost of fortifying them
and once the necessary political guarantees were in place they
could pull down their huts and sail away. The aim of this pre-
sent article is not to deal further with the political situation,
but rather to focus on what happened to the Koreans involved.
Western accounts
The opening up of the nations of East Asia brought Europeans
and Americans into much greater contact with the area and its
people than had been possible before. Diplomats, traders andtravellers began to pen accounts of these ancient lands, newly
exposed to a foreign, western gaze. One of the most entertaining
and enthralling given his eye-witness reportage of many signif-
icant scenes and events is A diplomat in Japan by Sir Ernest
Satow, which was published in 1921 based on journal entries
made decades earlier. Satow, for example, was involved in the
immediate aftermath of the Namagugi Incident of 1862 and
was actually aboard HMS Argus when that ship was part of
the British naval squadron that bombarded Kagoshima the fol-
lowing year. Regarding mainland Korea, publications by early
British and American representatives in Seoul are significant,
especially the writings of Britain’sWilliamCarles, who has been
described as ‘the first European traveller of standing in Korea’
(Lautensach, 1945: 49). Carles wrote a report for the British
government on his travels in Korea in 1883 and again in 1884;
he gave a lecture on the country to the Royal Geographical
Society in January 1886, which was published in the Society’s
then journal (Carles, 1886) and published his book, Life in
Corea, in 1888. Carles was aware of the European ignorance
of Korea and its customs and consciously set out to inform
his readers about the country. His book has an account of his
own experiences in being appointed to diplomatic service in
Korea but mainly concerns the extensive journey he made, lar-
gely in the north of the country. As well as detailing his travels
(and travails) Carles writes about agriculture, industry, history,
pottery, geology, antiquities, religion, fishing, mining, the
weather, language, and gives an account (not first hand, he
was not present) of the Gapsin Coup of 1884.
An American counterpart of William Carles was George
Clayton Foulk who, before taking over from Lucius Foote
as US representative in 1885, had travelled widely around
the south of Korea in both September 1884 and that Novem-
ber. The second trip was the longer, a 900 mile (c. 1450 km)
journey in sedan chairs with two companions, Chon Yang-
muk and Chong Su-il, accompanied by a servant, two grooms
and 12 chair bearers. The party had five trunks, three bags and
a camera, tripod, gun, also a money basket to carry the near
valueless Korean coins, three kilogrammes weight or 1000
one pun coins to the American dollar. One of their horses car-
ried the money, which had to be replenished en route (Hawley,
2008). Another western traveller in 1884 was a German geolo-
gist, Carl Christian Gottsche, who made two journeys in June
and August, but largely restricted his observations to geology.
The fact that the travels of these westerners could only
begin after Korea’s 1882 Shufeldt Treaty with the US, its first
with a western nation, makes earlier observations from visitors
to Geomundo all the more valuable for the light they throw on
rural life in traditional, pre-treaty Korea. These accounts date
back to Captain Belcher’s survey of Port Hamilton in 1845,
with much more detail available from contacts in 1859, 1875,
1884 and then comes the records from the British occupation
of 1885-1887. Two themes emerge. First what the archives
and accounts reveal about the quotidian life of the Koreans
living on Geomundo. This is an exercise in social history; the
islanders were not yangban, not high status, not rulers or offi-
cials, but what in Europe would have been seen as peasants.
Secondly, the later accounts show how the islanders’ lives were
affected by the advent of the British military, not, as will be
seen, amongst them, rather beside them. The accounts interro-
gated here come from the original manuscripts, only some of
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Archives at Kew, outside London.
Traditional life at Port Hamilton
Captain Sir Edward Belcher named the anchorage Port Hamil-
ton in 1845, after the then Secretary to the Admiralty. In the
book that emanated from his Asian surveying voyages on
HMS Samarang (Belcher, 1848) he noted four fishing villages
on the islands, with social leadership being exercised by elders
in the absence of any civil authority or military personnel.
Later accounts in the pre-annexation period add more detail.
Charles Wilford, a botanist collecting for the Royal Botanic
Gardens at Kew in England, made a ten-day visit to
Geomundo in May 1859 and left a journal.1 Two further
accounts emanate from a British navy fact-finding mission of
August 1875 when the British were considering the seizure of
Port Hamilton: a naval officer, Cyprian Bridge, wrote an arti-
cle describing the islands in the Fortnightly Review (1876) and
Francis Plunkett, a British diplomat normally stationed at
Tokyo, prepared a report on the islands for the Foreign
Secretary.2 In the event the British did not then take Port
Hamilton, largely for fear that doing so would encourage other
nations to follow suit and annex territory in the region.
However, as described above, the political situation between
Britain and Russia worsened in 1884, so the idea of seizing
the islands was revived and another report was commissioned,
this from Commander Reginald Carey-Brenton of HMS
Merlin.3
These accounts confirm that no military forces or civil
authorities resided on Geomundo. There was no doubt that
the islands and their inhabitants were Korean, speaking that
language and paying taxes to the mainland but, as Carey-
Brenton noted, the islands were ‘perfectly neglected’ by their
nation, which seemed unaware of the archipelago’s strategic
potential. Even the official who received the taxes – usually
paid in salt and/or rice – was said never to appear. In the
absence of outside authority it was the village elders who kept
order, apparently using a tobacco pipe to chastise the unruly.
William Carles (1886) later described such Korean pipes as
having a stem long enough to be used as a walking stick.
The four villages were said to house around 250 people each,
although Bridge had the more northerly of the villages on
Seodo, now also called Seodo, (formerly Chang-tsun) as the
largest. One village, probably Deokchon (Tek-tsun) on Seodo,
was described by Wilford as being attractively sited with
houses that he compared in appearance to beehives, neatly
thatched and surrounded by stone walls. Plunkett saw the
houses as mushrooms with their convex thatched roofs visible
behind the high walls that separated them from other dwell-
ings. The writers could not have known these were just the1 Kew Collectors, Charles Wilford 1857–63. Royal Botanic Gardens
Library KCL/13/1.
2 Francis Plunkett to Sir Harry Parkes, 11 August 1875, enclosure in
Parkes to the Earl of Derby. Correspondence Respecting the Relations
Between Japan and Corea and theProposed Occupation of Port
Hamilton by Great Britain. The National Archives (TNA) FO
881/2700.
3 Reginald Carey-Brenton, (1885) Port Hamilton Report, 26 Decem-
ber 1884. Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee, 67. TNA ADM
116/70.chogajip houses of the poorer classes to be found widely across
Korea at this period.
Strangers were not normally allowed into the settlements
never mind the houses, but Carey-Brenton did got to visit a
house after arguing that this was the usual custom of his coun-
try. Before he could do so, word had had to be sent ahead to
warn the women of the house to hide away, for interaction
with strangers or even sight of them was not permitted. All
the reports mention this but, again, these westerners would
not have known they were describing a national characteristic.
On his mainland journeys George Foulk found that Korean
women who observed him, ‘sneak up hills and banks off the
road, hide their faces, and even lie down to hide behind rocks’
(Hawley, 2008). Wilford, who unashamedly had crept up to a
house and peered over its wall, described island women as
wearing dresses of calico, fashioned like an English gown with
a broad waistband and a skirt reaching to the ground above
bare feet. Men, he noted, wore white flowing robes with loose
trousers. He was particularly taken by the wide-brimmed hats
worn by married men, which it transpired were also common
elsewhere (Carles, 1888). The island men were curious about
the foreigners they encountered. Charles Wilford initially com-
mented on the good behaviour of those who came to visit him,
although later he remarked that he could not keep them out of
his tent and that he found their overt physicality to be trouble-
some. This sentiment was echoed by Francis Plunkett when
reporting on a meeting with islanders on a large mat spread
beneath a tree. He was careful to observe that the men were
neither hostile nor rude, but did remark with surprise upon
their close physical inspection of him in a manner that would
not have been familiar to this mid-Victorian, upper class, Irish
gentleman (he later became Sir Francis), for the locals put their
hands in his pockets, felt up and down his legs and arms to dis-
cover what he had on underneath his outer garments and tried
on his hat. Men usually had their pipes and, in addition to the
use of tobacco, consumed much alcohol. From descriptions by
Plunkett and Bridge this was probably makgeolli, made from
rice. Both found its taste to be sour. Wilford and Plunkett
remarked on the men (they could not judge the woman) as
being dirty and there was much evidence of the ravages of
smallpox. On the positive side the British and Irish visitors
noted high literacy rates and that the villages contained
schools.
Fishing was the principal economic activity on Geomundo
with limited subsistence agriculture, which was carried out, lar-
gely by the women, although men did the ploughing. Cereals,
especially millet and rice, with sweet potatoes comprised the
principal crops in the stony volcanic soils. Bridge noted that
the slopes were green with unripe millet in 1875. The islands’
tough grass was not suitable for sheep and nor were poultry
kept, although there were some cattle and pigs. One agricul-
tural constraint was the limited supply of fresh water on these
small islands.Interactions
It might be expected that being peremptorily occupied by
foreigners without warning would have been entirely to the
Geomundo islanders’ detriment. However, island peoples are
often of a practical bent and there is evidence to indicate that
they not only made the best of their new situation but also
26 S.A. Royletried to exploit the British. Additionally, Carey-Brenton had
observed that the islanders had no particular political views.
Perhaps the hurt caused to Korean national pride by the occu-
pation was something that did not particularly concern the
locals, their nation being rather distant from – and neglectful
of – their islands. Further, the British were rather sensitive in
their dealings with the islanders. From the start there was a
policy of keeping servicemen away from the locals: the shore
garrison was housed on the hitherto uninhabited Godo
(Observatory Island); the marines were forbidden to leave
camp; and the sailors were kept on the ships except when
working. This enabled island cultural traditions to be main-
tained, especially the requirement for women to be kept away
from strangers or men outside their family. In June 1886
Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, Commander-in-Chief
of Britain’s naval China Station, was quite open about the
advantages this policy had brought, not only to the quietude
of his responsibility of Port Hamilton, but also in the wider
political sphere.
Although these islands have been in our possession for over
a year, there has been no sexual communication between our
men and the native women . . . the respect paid to their customs
has raised our national character not only in the islands but
has spread to the mainland and, doubtless to North China.4
That the island women were not molested by British service
personnel was, of course, a good thing, but only in a negative
way in that no harm was done. There were also positive bene-
fits from the occupation. One was in the opportunity it pro-
vided for employment. Outside labour was brought into
carry out skilled work, such as building the barracks, but there
was sometimes unskilled work available for the island men and
at times up to 300 were employed, especially on building a
breakwater from Dongdo towards Godo to narrow the
entrance into the inner harbour. Further, the daily log kept
by the base’s senior officer records him in December 1885
receiving a deputation of islanders seeking further employ-
ment.5 Perhaps as a consequence, a team from the islands
was working the following month on levelling a parade ground
on Godo. Indeed, after a theft of tools thought to be the work
of labourers from the Korean mainland, it was determined
that none but Geomundo men could be employed on Godo,
except regarding skilled work outside their experience or com-
petence.6 However appreciative they were of the islanders, the
British still felt able to refuse a request for a loan to pay taxes,
an example of islanders trying to exploit the situation in which
they had been placed.7
Initially, wages were paid in food but once the local short-
ages that were causing problems to islanders in early 1885 were
overcome by such earnings a deputation of elders asked for
cash payments instead and a British official had to visit the
mainland to secure a large enough quantity of the near value-
less Korean coins to meet this demand. A contract for labour
was posted on 25 August 1885, which set out the wage rate,4 Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, 1 June 1886, enclosure in the Secretary to Sir Phillip Currie,
17 July 1886. Further Correspondence Respecting the Temporary
Occupation of Port Hamilton by Her Majesty’s Government 1886.
TNA FO 405/36.
5 Port Hamilton Senior Officer’s Log, 25 December 1885. TNA
ADM 116/71.
6 Log, 14 February 1886. TNA ADM 116/71.
7 Log, 20 April 1886. TNA ADM 116/71.‘forbade idleness or skulking’ which if detected would see the
labourer reported by his overseer to the British officer who
could order wages to be stopped. Theft would lead to
dismissal.8
Another opportunity regarded the leasing of land to the
British. Godo was not settled but patches of it were farmed
and the British were willing to compensate farmers for appro-
priating their land. Geomundo might have been seized by an
ironclad battleship presumably ready to have discharged its
armament in the unlikely eventuality of opposition but, ini-
tially anyway, the occupiers recognised that islanders had
rights to their land, that this was not terra nullius. Always
unsure if and for how long they would be in occupation of Port
Hamilton, the British did not buy land, but leased it on a roll-
ing six-moth contract. In July 1885 owners of plots required on
Godo were brought onto their land to demonstrate its extent
by walking round its boundaries, with other farmers watching
to help keep their colleagues honest. A naval officer marked
the boundaries on a map and plots were then leased by the
British, who paid six month’s rent in advance.9 This event
was of sufficient note to be drawn to the attention of the
Marquis of Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary and Prime
Minister.10 Other plots were taken later for facilities such as a
hospital and graveyard as the British presence matured. The
islanders were keen enough to lease land in order to receive
a regular income from their holding without the necessity of
working it, but there was some disappointment when it was
made clear that they would remain responsible for paying
taxes due on their land.
Whilst it is clear that the Korean islanders got some ben-
efits from the British presence in terms of employment and,
for some, the leasing of land, there was also a downside
beyond any hurt to identity. In political discussions at the
government level there was a constant refrain that Geo-
mundo had been taken only as a temporary measure, which
in the end did prove to be the case, but de facto, if never
de jure, the British were in charge. Until a few weeks before
abandonment it was not known what was to happen and a
rule of law had had to be imposed to deal with situations that
arose, although the British did not interfere with local issues
within the villages, the Korean justice system remaining in
place and there are records of magistrates visiting during
the occupation. British justice was imposed with regard to
islanders’ interactions with the military. A naval officer
reported to a newspaper that it was ‘imprudent’ to be over-
kind to the Koreans, ‘it was found politic to give them an
occasional fright, with perhaps a touch of physical argument
. . . severity tempered by mercy or mercy tempered by a little
stick’ (Cole, 1886). Actually it was a whip that was used and
the Senior Officer’s log reports at least three cases where
Koreans were flogged. There are other instances of fines
being imposed on islanders for theft and, in another case a
village headman was fined for allowing a Japanese man to
set up a brothel, a type of establishment that had been seen
as counter to good order and military discipline. An earlier8 Enclosure in William Aston to Roderick O’Conor, 3 September
1885. Correspondence From Corea 1885. TNA FO 228/795.
9 Log, 6 and 8 July 1885. TNA ADM 116/71.
10 Admiral Sir Montague Dowell to Roderick O’Conor, 4 July 1885,
enclosure in O’Conor to the Marquis of Salisbury, 16 July 1885.
Correspondence Respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port
Hamilton by Her Majesty’s Government, 1885. TNA FO 405/35.
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with others, escaped from the barracks to make use of its ser-
vices but drowned when the boat capsized – he could not
swim and was anyway weighed down by the heavy load of
coins in his pockets.11 Another issue regarded the need felt
by the British to protect people who worked for them. This
applied particularly to an interpreter who village headmen
thought was involved in a theft of tools. He, like other sus-
pects, was brought, bound, to the Senior Officer, who imme-
diately demanded, the man’s release, not because it was likely
that he was innocent – all agreed the man was a rogue and he
was soon dismissed back to the mainland – but because he
worked for the British. The headman was told sternly by
the officer that ‘if he ever dared to treat anyone employed
by our Big Queen in the same manner I should flog him’.12
It was clear then who was master on the ground and on
the water at Port Hamilton/Geomundo, however nuanced
the political discussions about sovereignty might be at the
diplomatic level.
Matters could have got worse for Geomundo’s inhabitants.
If the British were to keep hold of Port Hamilton for an
extended period, the anchorage would have had to be fortified.
In an emergency, as with the threat of immediate war with
Russia in early 1885, the navy could use its ships to defend
the base. Long term, that would not be an effective use of
naval assets, there are better uses for ships than acting as static
gun platforms. So there were plans to provide fortifications on
Geomundo itself, which, if built, would have necessitated the
British moving from Godo onto Seodo and Dongdo. Had this
have happened, despite initial claims that the islanders would
not be affected adversely by the British occupation, there
would have been the complete deportation of the indigenous
population. Their continued presence would not have been
conducive to the operation of what would then have become
a much more extensive military base. Admiral Hamilton was
worried about this; he felt deportation would be a moral out-
rage but his concern was not for the islanders, rather it was for
the ‘immense harm’ that would be caused to Britain’s reputa-
tion.13 Armand Powlett, a navel officer at Port Hamilton, had
advised Admiral Hamilton that in such a restricted spatial set-
ting as Geomundo ‘there is not room for civilization and bar-
barism to exist side by side’.14 Captain Powlett did not identify
to which categories the islanders and the invaders belonged,
but in the event, the British had not had to venture beyond
Godo before civilization and barbarity were separated by their
giving up occupation on 27 February 1887.
Conclusion
The brief Port Hamilton Affair was of a political and geopolit-
ical significance belied by the small scale of its actual activity.11 Log, 19 November 1885. TNA ADM 116/71.
12 Log, 26 and 27 September 1886. TNA ADM 116/71.
13 Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, 1 June 1886, enclosure in the Secretary to Currie, 17 July
1886. Further Correspondence Respecting the Temporary Occupation
of Port Hamilton byHerMajesty’s Government 1886. TNAFO 405/36.
14 Captain Armand Powlett to Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton,
7 April 1886, enclosure in the Secretary to Currie, 4 June 1886. Further
Correspondence Respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port
Hamilton by Her Majesty’s Government 1886. TNA FO 405/36.It is an interesting example of the somewhat aggressive
approach to East Asia displayed by the West at this period
when gun boat diplomacy was quite commonly encountered
and the nations of the region were opened up, rather against
their wishes. The Affair also speaks to the rivalry between
Great Britain and Russia in Asia, sometimes referred to as
the Great Game. However, this paper focused more on what
light an interrogation of the archives relating to Port Hamilton
could shed on Korean social history. Given Britain’s long
standing interest in the Geomundo archipelago, rather in what
advantages possession of its splendid harbour might bring to
its navy, there were enquiries and reports about the islands
and their people in advance of the first western travel accounts
to be written about the Korean mainland. Documenting the
housing, economic and social activity, and gender relations
to be revealed was one achievement of the paper. Another
was to detail the way in which the islanders interacted with
the British occupiers often to their advantage, although the
fact that the local people would have been deported had the
British extended their operations demonstrates where true
power lay on this island edge of empire.
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